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Experiments using economic games are becoming a major source for the study of human social behavior.
These experiments are usually conducted with university students who voluntarily choose to participate.
Across the natural and social sciences, there is some concern about how this ‘‘particular’’ subject pool may
systematically produce biased results. Focusing on social preferences, this study employs data from a
survey-experiment conducted with a representative sample of a city’s population (N 5 765). We report
behavioral data from five experimental decisions in three canonical games: dictator, ultimatum and trust
games. The dataset includes students and non-students as well as volunteers and non-volunteers. We
separately examine the effects of being a student and being a volunteer on behavior, which allows a ceteris
paribus comparison between self-selected students (students*volunteers) and the representative
population. Our results suggest that self-selected students are an appropriate subject pool for the study of
social behavior.
A
n introduction on the importance of experimental research using economic games is no longer necessary.
Economic experiments are well established as a useful tool for studying human behavior within social
scientists. Over the last years however, human experimentation has also found a central place in the
research agendas of evolutionary biologists1–6, physiologists7–12, neuroscientists13–18 and physicists19–24. The
increasing number of well-published experimental studies and the impact they have on various fields across a
number of disciplines has touched off a lively debate over the degree to which these data can indeed be used to
refine, falsify and develop new theories, to build institutions and legal systems, to inform policy and to evenmake
general inferences about the human nature25–29. In other words, the central issue is now about the external validity
of the experimental data.
The main concern about external validity is related to certain features of experimental practices on the one
hand (high levels of scrutiny, low monetary stakes and the abstract nature of the tasks), and a very particular
subject pool on the other.
The latter has two dimensions. First, the subject pool in behavioral experiments is almost exclusively comprised
of university students. More than the narrow socio-demographic array of characteristics that this group offers,
what really threatens external validity is the existence of different behavioral patterns once such characteristics
have been controlled for. That is, the under-representation of certain strata of the population is obviously true but
not the real issue: once the distribution of these characteristics is known for the general population, researchers
can account for such differences by adjusting the right weights to their statistical models. The real question in
extrapolating students’ behavior to general populations is whether the coefficient estimates differ across the
groups due to non-controllable variables. We should say that there is student bias if, after controlling for
socio-demographics, students behave differently than the general population. The second dimension is that
participants are volunteers. Naturally, the behavior of non-volunteers is not observed. There is a self-selection
bias if volunteers share some attributes that make their behavior systematically diverge from that of non-
volunteers.
The concern of the researchers of such biases is echoed by the increasing number of studies recruiting other,
more general samples. A pronounced example is the use of the web in order to recruit subjects using platforms
such as the Amazon Mechanical Turk30,31. Such attempts are very valuable since alternative samples are the best
way of testing the robustness and generality of the results. However without specific information on how the
alternative subject pool affects the results, leaving the physical laboratory and the control that this offers can be
time-, energy- and money-consuming without necessarily positive returns in terms of generalizability.
So far insights as to whether student and self-selection biases systematically affect behavior can be foundmainly
in the economics’ literature. Regarding student bias there are twomain sources. The first comes from experiments
using both students and individuals pooled from a target population32–36. These belong to the family of the so-
called artefactual field experiments37. The second comes from databases containing behavioral data drawn from
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more general populations. This allows researchers to test whether
different sub-samples (e.g., students) exhibit different behavioral
patterns38–43. In the realm of social preferences, both practices have
been extensively used over the last years, giving rise to a large number
of field experiments. There is now plenty of evidence demonstrating
that students are slightly less ‘‘pro-social’’ than other groups in a
variety of designs and settings. For example students have been
shown to behave less generously44,45, less cooperatively40,42,46,47 and
less trustfully48,49.
However, the bulk of this evidence comes from comparing students
who self-select to experiments with other non-student samples who
again self-select. So, what this literature gives evidence for is a small
student bias but only within volunteers. Whether self-selected stu-
dents’ behavior is representative for individuals who are not students
and do not volunteer in scientific studies (presumably the ‘‘median’’
individual) we cannot know. Nor can we know whether self-selected
students behave differently than non-self-selected students (the
majority of the student population); ultimately we cannot know
whether students in general are less pro-social than non-students
(either self-selected or not). Thus, responding to concerns about stu-
dent bias requires the simultaneous study of self-selection bias, which
ultimately implies looking also within non-student populations.
Concerning self-selection bias, research has been relatively limited
since this involves obtaining behavioral data of individuals not willing
to participate to experiments. For student populations, researchers get
hold of such datasets by making participation semi-obligatory during
a class50,51. However, there are good reasons to assume that the beha-
vior of these pseudo-volunteers will be quite distinct of the non-
volunteers’ due to prominent demand effects52. Indeed both Eckel
and Grossman (2000)50 in a Dictator Game where the recipient was
a charity and Cleave et al. (in press)51 in a Trust Game found pseudo-
volunteers to behave more ‘‘pro-socially’’, which is in accordance of
such hypothesis. Such effects could be even more pronounced when
the experimenter is a professor of that specific class or course. The
most recent evidence concerning self-selection49 compares the fre-
quency of a non-experimental decision (i.e., donation to a fund)
between students who self-select to experiments and students who
do not and finds no difference. Focusing on non-student populations,
an appropriate dataset is even more difficult to obtain. We are aware
of only two studies Anderson et al. (in press)47 compares truck drivers
(a kind of pseudo-volunteers) with volunteers sampled from a non-
student population in a social dilemma game; Bellemare and Kro¨ger
(2007)48 compares the distribution of attributes between participants
of a survey who decide to participate in an experiment and those who
decide not to. Both studies report non-significant differences.
Summarizing, the literature is not conclusive on whether self-
selection is an issue in extrapolating experimental subjects’ behavior
into other groups. Even less on whether self-selection affects students
and non-students in the sameway since differences inmethodologies
(regarding whether the comparison is about attributes or decisions,
whether the latter are experimental or non-experimental and more
importantly whether the same design and recruitment procedures
were followed) do not allow comparisons.
So, studies on student and self-selection bias, taken together sug-
gest that studying the representativeness of subjects’ social behavior
requires the simultaneous examination of student bias within both
volunteers and non-volunteers and self-selection bias within both
students and non-students.
Using the 23 2 factorial design depicted in Figure 1a, we report
data from a large-scale survey-experiment that allows such a ceteris
paribus investigation of student and self-selection bias.
A representative sample of a city’s adult population participated in
three experimental games (Dictator Game (DG), Ultimatum Game
(UG), and Trust Game (TG)) involving five decisions (see Figure 2).
In addition, a rich socio-demographic set of information was gath-
ered in order to serve as controls, which are necessary in order to
isolate student and self-selection effects. Lastly, each individual was
classified as a volunteer or non-volunteer based on their willingness
to participate in future experiments in the laboratory (see Methods).
Our final sample (N5 765 after excluding incomplete observations)
therefore consists of both students and non-students as well as both
volunteers and non-volunteers (see Figure 1b).
Results
As Figure 1b illustrates, our final sample consists of:
. 22% students (n 5 170).
. 46% volunteers (n 5 350).
. 12% ‘‘standard’’ subject pool (students x volunteers) (n 5 90).
The first models (left-hand side) in each column of Table 1 report the
estimatedmain effects of being a student and a volunteer on behavior.
The secondmodels explore the interaction effects of the two (student
3 volunteer). These models allow student bias to be studied sepa-
ratelywithin volunteers and non-volunteers and in the samemanner,
self-selection bias within students and non-students. The regressions
in columns i, ii, and iiimodel participants’ offers in the DG, the UG
and the difference between the two (thus capturing strategic beha-
vior) respectively. Columns iv, v, and vi repeat the same exercise for
the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) as a second mover in the UG,
the decision to pass money or not in the binary TG, and the decision
to return money or not as a second mover in the same game, respect-
ively. Note that in all regressions we control for basic socio-demo-
graphics (age, sex, income and educational level) as well as for risk
and time preferences, cognitive abilities and social capital as possible
confounding factors.
Figure 1 | Experimental design and sample classification.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates from the between-group
comparisons obtained by the corresponding Wald tests on Table 1
models.
Student bias: Students are more strategic players (p 5 0.012)
mostly because they make less generous DG offers (p 5 0.060).
However, these differences are never larger than 6% of the pie.
Through Wald tests, we identify the student bias to be mainly man-
ifested among volunteers (A vs. C, p 5 0.028; see Table 2).
Self-selection bias: Volunteers are more likely to both trust (6.6%,
marginal effects corresponding to the probit estimates reported in
Tables 1 and 2) and to reciprocate the trust (7.7%) than non-volun-
teers in the TG (p5 0.051 and p5 0.011, respectively). However, the
first difference vanishes when making pairwise comparisons within
groups. That is, the aggregate effect is not specifically attributable to
either students (A vs. B) or non-students (C vs. D) (p. 0.12 in both
cases). The second difference can be essentially traced back to non-
students (p5 0.023) since it is largely insignificant for students (p5
0.440). Nonetheless, self-selection bias slightly affects students as
well: self-selected students make (marginally) significantly higher
offers than the rest of students in the UG (p 5 0.084).
As a final exercise we compare self-selected students with both the
rest of the sample (A vs. B1 C1 D) and group D, which comprises
non-students, non-volunteers as an estimation of the subject-pool
bias. We find the behavior of group A to be different from the rest
of the sample only regarding UG offers, and at marginally significant
levels (p5 0.092), as they offerJ0.66 more (3.3% of the pie). As can
be inferred from Table 2, this effect must be emanating from the self-
selection bias revealed in this decision among students. The compar-
ison between groups A andD yields only one (marginally) significant
result as well. Self-selected students increase their offers between DG
and UG by J0.94 more than non-self-selected, non-students (p 5
0.094). This effect makes sense as well since students have been
reported previously to be more strategic players than non-students
(A1 B vs. C1 D). Finally, since self-selection was revealed to be an
issue only among non-students (C vs. D), the absence of significant
differences in TG behavior (ps . 0.49) is not surprising.
Due to the complex interpretation of non-linear interaction
effects53, we replicate the regressions of columns iv, v, and vi using
one dummy for each group (A, B, C, and D). The results remain
exactly the same. Additionally, replication of the regressions using
alternative classification of students does not alter the general picture
(see Methods and Tables S2 - S4 in the supplementary materials).
Discussion
This paper presents data that allows disentangling the separate
effects of student and self-selection bias. Evidence for both is found.
Figure 2 | Experimental decisions57–60.
Table 1 | Student and self-selection biases on behavior
DG
i
UG
ii
UG-DG
iii
MAO
iv
TG trustor
v
TG trustee
vi
students 20.060*
(0.032)
20.067
(0.044)
0.007
(0.015)
20.006
(0.021)
0.054**
(0.021)
0.047
(0.030)
20.039
(0.105)
20.079
(0.165)
20.167
(0.152)
20.242
(0.198)
20.083
(0.143)
20.034
(0.191)
volunteers 0.039
(0.026)
0.036
(0.024)
0.023
(0.015)
0.016
(0.016)
20.010
(0.019)
20.013
(0.019)
0.019
(0.092)
0.000
(0.112)
0.196*
(0.101)
0.159
(0.103)
0.239**
(0.094)
0.266**
(0.117)
students3
volunteers
0.013
(0.052)
0.027
(0.027)
0.013
(0.039)
0.077
(0.201)
0.149
(0.259)
20.096
(0.268)
R2 0.0941 0.0943 0.0223 0.0224 0.0600 0.0604 0.1012 0.1013
LR 3.80*** 3.79*** 1.46** 1.46** 5.81*** 5.68*** 56.02*** 56.60*** 78.49*** 81.52*** 98.87*** 98.20***
Notes: The dependent variables are (i) the fraction offered in DG; (ii) the fraction offered in UG; (iii) the fraction offered in UG - the fraction offered in DG; (iv) the minimum acceptable offer as a fraction of the
pie in UG; (v) TG decision as a trustor - 1 if (s)he makes the loan, zero otherwise; and (vi) TG decision as a trustee - 1 if (s)he returns part of the loan, zero otherwise. Models iand ii are Tobit regressions, model
iii is an OLS regression; model iv is an ordered probit regression, while the last two models are Probit regressions.N5765 in all regressions. Controls are: age, gender, education, household income, social
capital, risk preferences, time preferences, and cognitive abilities. The variables are explained in depth in the supplementary materials. All models are also controlling for order effects. All the likelihood
ratios (LR) shown correspond toChi2 statistics, except for column iii, where they are based on F. Robust SE clustered by interviewer (108 groups) and presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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However, the results also tell another parallel story: in five experi-
mental decisions and following the exact same procedures for all
subjects, self-selected students have been proven to behave in a very
similar manner with every other group separately and in combina-
tion. Indeed, at the conventional 5% level only one significant effect
concerning self-selected students is observed and, in addition, the
difference is economically small. That said, we suggest that the find-
ings do not discredit the use of self-selected students in experiments
measuring social preferences. Rather the opposite: the convenient
sample of self-selected college students that allowed a boom in
human experimentation in both social and natural sciences produces
qualitatively and quantitatively accurate results. Models on human
social behavior, evolutionary dynamics and social networks together
with the implications that they bare are not in danger from this
particular subject pool. The results caution, however, on the use of
alternative samples such as self-selected non-students that typically
participate in artefactual field and internet experiments, aimed at
better representativeness, since the effect of self-selection can be even
more pronounced outside the student community (self-selection bias
is proved to be an issue mainly among non-students in the Trust
Game).
Methods
The experiment took place fromNovember 23rd to December 15th 2010. A total of 835
individuals aged between 16 and 91 years old participated in the experiment. One out
of ten participants was randomly selected to be paid. The average earnings among
winners, including those winning nothing (18.75%), were J9.60.
Sampling. A stratified random method was used to obtain the sample. In particular,
the city of Granada (Spain) is divided into nine geographical districts, which served as
sampling strata. Within each stratum we applied a proportional random method to
minimize sampling errors. In particular, the sample was constructed in four
sequential steps: 1. We randomly selected a number of sections proportional to the
number of sections within each district; 2. We randomly selected a number of streets
proportional to the number of streets within each section; 3. We randomly selected a
number of buildings proportional to the number of buildings on each street; 4.
Finally, we randomly selected a number of apartments proportional to the number of
apartments within each building. Thismethod ensures a geographically representative
sample. Detailed information can be found in supplementary materials.
Our sample consists of individuals who agreed to complete the survey at the
moment the interviewers asked them to participate. Being interviewed in their own
apartments decreased opportunity cost (thus increasing the participation rate). In
order to control for selection bias within households, only the individual who opened
the door was allowed to participate. Lastly, the data collection process was well
distributed across both daytime and weekday. Our sampling procedure resulted in a
representative sample in terms of age and sex (see Table S7 in the supplementary
materials).
Interviewers. The data were collected by 216 university students (grouped in 108
pairs) enrolled in a course on field experiments in the fall of 2010. The students
underwent ten hours of training in the methodology of economic field experiments,
conducting surveys, and sampling procedures. Their performance was carefully
monitored through a web-based system (details in the supplementary materials).
Protocol.The interviewers introduced themselves to the prospective participants and
explained that they were carrying out a study for the University of Granada. Upon
agreement to participate, the participants were informed that the data would be used
for scientific purposes only and under conditions of anonymity according to the
Spanish law on data protection. One interviewer always read the questions aloud,
while the other noted down the answers (with the exception of the experimental
decisions). The survey lasted on average 40 minutes and consisted of three parts. In
the first part, extensive socioeconomic information of the participants was collected
including, among others, risk and time preferences, and social capital. In the second
part, participants played three paradigmatic games of research on social preferences,
namely the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game and the Trust Game (see Figure 2).
In the last part, they had to state their willingness to participate in future monetary-
incentivized experiments (which would take place in the laboratory at the School of
Economics).
Experimental games.At the beginning of the second part, and before any details were
given about each decision in particular, the participants received some general
information about the nature of the experimental economic games according to
standard procedures. In particular, participants were informed that:
. The five decisions involved real monetary payoffs coming from a national
research project endowed with a specific budget for this purpose.
. The monetary outcome would depend only on the participant’s decision or on
both his/her own and another randomly matched participant’s decision, whose
identity would forever remain anonymous.
. One of every ten participants would be randomly selected to be paid,
and the exact payoff would be determined by a randomly selected role. In decid-
ing 1/10 instead of higher probabilities (for instance 1/5), we took into account
two issues: the cognitive effects of using other probabilities and the (commuting)
costs of paying people given the dispersion of participants throughout the city.
Interestingly, 297 subjects (39% of the sample) believed that they would be
selected to be paid (last item of the second part).
. Matching and payment would be implemented within the next few days.
. The procedures ensured absolute double-blinded anonymity by using a decision
sheet, which they would place in the envelope provided and then seal. Thus,
participants’ decisions would remain forever blind in the eyes of the interviewers,
the researchers, and the randomly matched participant.
Once the general instructions had been given, the interviewer read the
details for each experimental decision separately. After every instruction set, parti-
cipants were asked to write down their decisions privately and proceed to the next
task. To control for possible order effects on decisions, the order both between and
within games was randomized across participants, resulting in 24 different orders
(always setting aside the two decisions of the same game).
In the Dictator and Ultimatum Game (proposer) participants had to split a pie of
J20 between themselves and another anonymous participant. Subjects decided
which share of theJ20 they wanted to transfer to the other participant. In the case of
the Ultimatum Game, implementation was upon acceptance of the offer by the
randomly matched responder; in case of rejection neither participant earned
anything. For the role of the responder in the Ultimatum Game we used the strategy
method in which subjects had to state their willingness to accept or reject each of the
proposals depicted in Figure 2. In the Trust Game, the trustor (1st pl.) had to decide
whether to pass J10 or J0 to the trustee (2nd pl.). In case of passing J0, the trustor
earnedJ10 and the trustee nothing. If she passedJ10, the trustee would receiveJ40
instead ofJ10 (money was being quadrupled). The trustee, conditional on the trustor
having passed the money had to decide whether to send back J22 and keep J18 for
himself or keep allJ40 without sending anything back, in which case the trustor did
not earn anything (see the supplementary materials).
Table 2 | Between-group comparisons
DG UG UG-DG MAO TG trustor TG trustee
Student bias
(A 1 B) vs (C 1 D) 20.060* 0.008 0.054** 20.039 20.168 20.083
A vs C 20.031 0.021 0.061** 20.002 20.093 20.130
B vs D 20.068 20.007 0.047 20.079 20.242 20.034
Self-selection bias
(A 1 C) vs (B 1 D) 0.040 0.023 20.010 0.020 0.197* 0.240**
A vs B 0.051 0.044* 0.000 0.078 0.309 0.170
C vs D 0.037 0.017 20.013 0.001 0.159 0.266**
Subject-pool bias
A vs (B 1 C 1 D) 20.012 0.033* 0.039 0.021 0.080 0.049
A vs D 20.017 0.038 0.047* 20.002 0.067 0.136
Notes: Letters A, B, C and D refer to the groups depicted in Figure 1a. Group A denotes students, volunteers; B students, non-volunteers; C non-students, volunteers; D non-students, non-volunteers. (A1 B)
correspond to all students (volunteers and non-volunteers); (C 1 D) to all non-students (volunteers and non-volunteers); (A 1 C) to all volunteers (students and non-students); (B 1 D) to all non-volunteers
(students and non-students). Lastly (B1C1D) correspond to the sum of the subject pool except students volunteers. *, ** indicate significance at the 0.10, and 0.05 levels, respectively. Comparisons based
on Wald tests from models of Table 1.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Classifying students. Individuals between 18 and 26 years old who reported to be
studying at the moment were classified as students. The upper age bound (26 years
old) was selected taking into account the mean maximum age of the lab experiments
taken place in the University of Granada and a large drop in the age histogram of our
sample. In order to address potential concerns regarding this classification,
alternative ways of classifying students were used. In particular we replicated the
analysis setting the upper bounds at 24 and 28 years old. Moreover, we did the same
classifying as ‘‘students’’ all individuals who have ever been in the university, without
posing any age limit whatsoever. Results in the three cases remained the same in
essence. The regressions can be found in the supplementary materials.
Classifying volunteers. Following Van Lange et al.54 in their application of the
measure developed byMcClintock and Allison55, we classified participants according
to the response to the following question:
‘‘At the School of Economics we invite people to come to make decisions with real
money like the ones you made earlier (the decisions in the envelope). If we invite
you, would you be willing to participate?’’
Note, however that we have intentionally removed any helping framing. Van Lange
et al. (54, pg. 281) for example first stated: ‘‘the quality of scientific research of
psychology at the Free University depends to a large extent on the willingness of
students to participate in these studies’’ and then proceeded in asking them their
willingness to participate in future studies. It is also important to mention that the
willingness to participate in future experiments was stated before matching between
participants and payments were done. So, by design, the variable of interest could not
have been affected by the outcome of the games.
Furthermore, in order to differentiate self-selection in economic experiments from
the general propensity to help research studies and the need for social approval (see
25), we also asked individuals about their willingness to participate in future surveys.
A total of 478 stated that they would be willing to participate in future surveys, while
only 350 said they would participate in experiments. Of these, 49 stated that they
would not participate in a survey. In addition, two months after the experiment, we
hired an assistant to call all the individuals classified as volunteers in order to confirm
their interest. In particular, we requested participants’ authorization to include their
data in the experimental dataset of the Economics Department (ORSEE)56. Of those
whowewere able to contact after two attempts on two consecutive days (60%), 97% of
students and 83% of non-students confirmed their interest. Not answering the phone
makes sense if we consider the enormous amount of telemarketing calls people
receive in Spain and evenmore so given that the assistantmade calls from a university
phone number which is comprised of 13 digits like those of telemarketing companies.
Note that regular private numbers in Spain have 9 digits.
Thismethod of classifying volunteers raises some concerns. In particular, the stated
preference regarding the willingness to participate in future experiments is never
realized. Despite our attempts to ensure that this was not just cheap talk (by being
granted permission to add individuals’ personal details in ORSEE) the matter of the
fact is that we do not know with certainty whether those classified as volunteers are
indeed volunteers. Actually, completely separating volunteers and non-volunteers is a
virtually impossible task. The very idea of volunteering is a continuous quality
instead. However, by definition, classification requires a line to be drawn. We believe
that this classification method provides a rather clean way to separate ‘more’ self-
selected from ‘less’ self-selected individuals.
A second concern is related to the fact that our sample consists of only individuals who
had accepted to fill in a survey. In other words it seems that we study self-selection using
an already self-selected sample. Note however that individuals have been self-selected into
filling in a survey and not into participating in a lab experiment. In addition our pro-
cedures decreased opportunity costs for participants minimizing this type of self-selec-
tion. So, individuals had to fill in the questionnaire in the comfort of their houses and
without any ex-ante commitment for the future, in contrast to most nation-wide surveys
(CentER, SOEP, BHPS, etc.). Actually, 38% of the participants were unwilling to par-
ticipate in a future survey while 54% were not willing to participate in a lab experiment.
This allowed us to observe experimental behavior of people not willing to participate in lab
experiments, playing with real money and what is more doing so voluntarily.
Of course it can still be true that we are missing one ‘‘extreme’’ category; those who
had refused participation in the survey in the first place. Even in this case however, if
self-selection does indeed affect behavior, it should do so even in the absence of this
extreme category.
Ethics statement. All participants in the experiments reported in the manuscript
were informed about the content of the experiment before to participate (see
Protocol). Besides, their anonymity was always preserved (in agreement with the
Spanish Law 15/1999 for Personal Data Protection) by assigning them randomly a
numerical code, which would identify them in the system. No association was ever
made between their real names and the results. As it is standard in socio-economic
experiments, no ethic concerns are involved other than preserving the anonymity of
participants.
This procedure was checked and approved by the Vicedean of Research of the
School of Economics of the University of Granada, the institution hosting the
experiment.
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